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A few weeks after Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast and
embarrassed the ill-prepared government, I was giving a talk on some legal
aspects of homeland security to a group of U.S. military general officers
and senior Department of Defense ("DOD") civilians. Inevitably, discus-
sion turned to the recent Katrina disaster and, in particular, to the vivid
scenes of stranded New Orleans residents, mass confusion among relief of-
ficials, looting, and of shots fired at military helicopters joining search and
rescue operations. After I reviewed the pertinent players and roles in dis-
aster preparedness and response and reminded them of the necessary coor-
dination between local, state, and federal actors, I reiterated the central
role of the states and governors in making first response decisions and de-
ciding whether and when to ask the President for federal support, civilian
or military. One of the generals raised his hand: "Sir, wouldn't this all
work a heck of a lot better if we just did away with the states?"
"Well, was it our federal system of government that was responsible
for the breakdown in responding to Katrina?" I asked. "Would you have
put DOD in charge of responding to the disaster?" It was a good teaching
moment. The frustration among the military and civilian leaders in the
room that day over how to mitigate a disaster of Katrina's magnitude was
palpable. The general's impatience with our governmental structure un-
derscores the importance of the central question that I will explore-who is
in charge when disaster strikes?
The general's implication that the military could have handled the Ka-
trina challenge if only it were given the job raises a related question of
domestic preparedness policy-should DOD be given a leadership role in
emergency response? Now, with one year of hindsight, what does the Ka-
trina experience teach us about the role the military should play in such
situations? Was the government's failure to prepare for and respond ade-
quately to Katrina due to our multi-layered federal structure or to a failure
of leaders to work together? Does the fact that the military works effec-
tively with a well-drilled chain of command suggest that it be given a cen-
tral role in disaster response?
Because Katrina could have been something far worse-a direct blow
from a Category Five hurricane on New Orleans, an avian flu pandemic, an
1. Director, Institute for National Security and Counter Terrorism, Laura J. & L. Douglas Mer-
edith Professor, Syracuse University.
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earthquake in California, or a biological weapons attack in several cities
simultaneously, for example-the need to better prepare for domestic cri-
ses is clear. As Katrina showed, big challenges may present themselves
with little time to prepare or react. Traditional governmental structures
and boundaries do not necessarily provide the best-organized responses to
these major problems. Yet it would be a mistake, in my view, simply to
give the job to our "can-do" military, which is one entity in government
that has shown it can do a job and do it well. In this setting, new plans for
governance during a crisis are needed-but not necessarily ones that cen-
tralize response authority or abandon the federal system.
After September 11, 2001, the major governmental reform in domestic
preparedness was the creation of a massive Department of Homeland Se-
curity ("DHS").3 Congress attempted to fuse 22 agencies and more than
170,000 personnel (including the principal disaster response agency in the
federal government, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
("FEMA")) into a single, functional unit. Four years later, some analysts
suggest that DHS has made homeland security governance more, rather
than less, difficult and that preparedness for disaster has been compro-
mised by massive bureaucracy and failed leadership in trying to build the
domestic equivalent of DOD.4 Disasters, whatever their nature, require
nimble responses, which are adaptable to the nature of the crises. As Ka-
trina showed, DHS has been anything but nimble, and burying FEMA
within the bureaucracy weakened what was a fairly effective federal disas-
ter response agency. There is no reason we should, in effect, repeat a post-
September 11 mistake and cede to another huge bureaucracy (DOD) the
leadership role in disaster response.
Before considering whether, followed by how, to fix what is broken in
disaster response, it is important to understand the role of the military in
the present disaster response landscape. In our society, the "who's in
charge" question in a Katrina-like crisis breaks into subsidiary questions-
are civilian or military leaders in charge and are the decisions made by the
federal government or the states? Our federal system carries great weight
in answering both questions. Federalism does, indeed, complicate the fash-
ioning of an efficient military role in disaster response, but our federal sys-
tem furthers important values that more than compensate for any lost
efficiencies.
First, federalism and the central role of governors in disaster response
decision making help cement civilian control over the military. This is a
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN-CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT AN-
NEX 3 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter NRP-CIA] ("A catastrophic incident may occur with little or no warn-
ing. Some incidents, such as rapid disease outbreaks, may be well underway before detection.").
3. Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
4. See David Heyman & James Jay Carafano, DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland
Security, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/
pubs/041213_dhsv2.pdf; Bill Lambrecht, FEMA Left in Weak State: Downgrading Began Long Before
Katrina, PrrrsBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 12, 2005, at A4; David Firestone, Conservatives Question
the Value of Reorganizing Domestic Security, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at A10.
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bedrock principle in our constitutional system.' Second, the creation of a
federal system of government in our Constitution gave birth to our modern
militia, the National Guard.6 The governors become, in effect, fifty com-
manders in chief of the military response to a disaster. Federalism thus
ensures that the default military response will be provided by National
Guard personnel under the governors' control, because all of us would
want to be rescued, cared for, and have our laws enforced by members of
our local communities. Bringing government closer to the people is a cen-
tral value of federalism.7
This Article concludes that our federal system does not unduly compli-
cate providing military support to disaster response. Katrina was a deba-
cle, and government made a bad storm much worse for many of its victims.
By and large, however, the mistakes during and after Katrina were due to
failures of command, cooperation, and integration of response at all levels
of government and between governmental and private sector agencies.
There was no effective unified command, and there was precious little co-
ordination and integration among government officials and agencies-civil-
ian and military. Since 2004, in its disaster planning documents and
Incident Command System ("ICS"), DHS has embraced the notion of uni-
fied command rather than the traditional chain of command or unity of
command.8 In the latter, everyone reports to one leader for the organiza-
tion. In the former, when incidents cross jurisdictional and agency lines,
responsible agencies and offices work together by designating members of
the unified command who, in turn, establish common objectives, strategies,
and an action plan.9
Effective disaster response must be agile and tailored to the nature of
the crisis. The best response mechanisms are network-based-civilian and
military, intergovernmental, multidisciplinary, public and private, and man-
aged through unified command but with ample discretion on the ground to
do the jobs that must be done.1" The military responders to Katrina actu-
ally performed better than many other governmental agencies, and their
role was properly in support of civilian authorities. A set of proposed legis-
lative reforms that would significantly federalize and militarize disaster re-
sponse is currently pending in Congress. I will suggest that much of the
proposed legislation be rejected. Instead, so long as some modest reforms
and more detailed plans are made, disaster response can be made more
5. The creation of a civilian commander in chief in Article II, § 2, along with the authorization
of Congress to call forth the militia in Article I, § 8, further illustrate the importance the Framers
attached to civilian control of the military when drafting the U.S. Constitution.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
7. See DAAN BRAVEMAN, WILLIAM C. BANKS & RODNEY A. SMOLLA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 265-66 (5th ed. 2005).
8. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 138 (Mar.
2004) [hereinafter NIMS].
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Donald P. Moynihan, Crisis Management Policy and Hierarchical Networks (La Fol-
lette Sch. of Pub. Affairs, Working Paper No. 2005-022, 2005), available at http://www.lafollette.wisc.
edu/publications/workingpapers.
2006]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
effective if those responsible for carrying out the plans practice them and
the key officials talk with one another at the right times.
The first portion of this Article will describe the role of the military in
disaster response historically and as it now is prescribed in law and plan-
ning documents. The second part will focus on what happened just before,
during, and after Hurricane Katrina's landfall. The third section will ex-
plore how and why federalism impacts the role of the military in disaster
response. Finally, a fourth section will review statutory reforms pending in
Congress that would significantly enhance the role of DOD in disaster re-
sponse. After critiquing these proposals, I will suggest that network-based
and regional reforms in disaster response may be grafted onto an already
promising ICS that will preserve a properly subordinate military role to the
principally involved and at-risk state and local decision makers.
II. THE MILITARY ROLE BEFORE AND AFTER KATRINA
Hurricane Katrina was a devastating disaster for its victims and a mon-
umental embarrassment for government. We saw the storm coming, pre-
pared our responses in advance, watched the storm strike, and then
watched again as our response systems failed-repeatedly. Poor planning,
inefficiency, and simple congestion stood in the way of pre-storm evacua-
tion. In Louisiana, response managers did not follow their own plans. First
responders were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster. Search,
rescue, and relief operations were inexcusably slow, and communications
and equipment shortfalls made matters worse. Looting and rioters added
to the list of problems.11
Although DOD began its alert and coordination work before landfall,
most deployed units did not arrive in the stricken area until several days
after the storm hit. State National Guard units were active early. National
Guard coordination came up short in some places, and their resources were
overwhelmed, in some instances, by the magnitude of the tasks. In the
aggregate, military support to Katrina-affected areas involved 70,000 per-
sonnel-more than any domestic disaster in our history.12 Approximately
20,000 of these troops were active duty, and the remaining 50,000 were
National Guard personnel.1 3 Why was the storm made worse by the gov-
ernmental response? Where were the failures, and to what extent did the
military make things better or worse?
Since September 11, 2001, in addition to the birth of DHS, DOD pro-
posed and the President approved creation of Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), which is the first combatant command established for the
11. These and other descriptions of the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina are,
unless otherwise noted, drawn from the SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARA-
TION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, 109TH CONG., FINAL REP.: A FAILURE OF INITIA-
TIVE, 2d Sess. (2006), available at http:// www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html [hereinafter FAILURE
OF INITIATIVE]; THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS
LEARNED (2006) [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED].
12. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 202.
13. Id.
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homeland's defense.14 Both DHS and NORTHCOM have essential roles
in disaster response. The Homeland Security Act placed the disaster re-
sponse components of FEMA within an Emergency Preparedness and Re-
sponse ("EPR") Directorate of DHS and made EPR responsible for
leading the federal disaster response and for shaping a new federal re-
sponse plan and incident management system.15 DHS is in charge of the
overall federal response while NORTHCOM directs the federal military
role in a disaster.
16
In February of 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presi-
dential Directive Number Five ("HSPD-5"), which required DHS to de-
velop a new all-hazards response plan to manage emergencies.
17
Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number Eight ("HSPD-8"), is-
sued in December of 2003, sets "a national domestic all-hazards prepared-
ness goal" for "improved delivery of Federal preparedness and assistance
to State and local governments" in response to "domestic terrorist attacks,
major disasters, and other emergencies."'" DOD is directed to describe
"the organizations and functions within the DOD that may be utilized to
provide support to civil authorities during a domestic crisis."19 Nine
months before Katrina's landfall, the National Response Plan ("NRP")
and the National Incident Management System ("NIMS") were issued by
DHS to provide an all-hazards framework for the federal response to do-
mestic emergencies including "Incidents of National Significance"
("INS")-those that would trigger the largest federal governmental
response.20
INS include "those high-impact events that require a coordinated and
effective response by an appropriate combination of federal, State, local,
tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental entities in order to save lives,
minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery
and mitigation activities."'2 1 Under the NRP, the federal response-civil
and military-comes after requests from state governors. The INS designa-
tion is important because only under such circumstances will the President
direct DHS to assume responsibility for managing an incident.
The NRP also anticipates, in its Catastrophic Incident Annex ("NRP-
CIA"), a possible proactive federal response when an emergency of
whatever origins
14. See ScoT SHEPHERD & STEVE BOWMAN, HOMELAND SECURITY: ESTABLISHMENT AND IM-
PLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REP.
No. RS21322 (2005).
15. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 30.
16. Id. at 36, 40.
17. Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. HSPD-5 (2003).
18. Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. HSPD-8 1 (2003).
19. Id. at 21.
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter
NRP]; NIMS, supra note 8.
21. NRP, supra note 20, at 3.
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results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or
disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure,
environment, economy, national morale, and/or government
functions. . .[;] almost immediately exceeds resources nor-
mally available to state, local, tribal and private-sector au-
thorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts
governmental operations and emergency services to such an
extent that national security could be threatened.22
The NRP-CIA states that a catastrophic incident will be declared only
when the resources of state and local authorities are "overwhelmed" and
local response personnel may be unable to respond because they have been
affected by the incident.23 Only the Secretary of DHS may implement the
NRP-CIA, and, once implemented, agencies with responsibilities under the
NRP are expected to begin their operations immediately.24 However, the
NRP-CIA concept of operations apparently would pre-deploy those fed-
eral resources only to staging areas until their presence is requested by
state and local authorities.25 Even in such dire circumstances, DOD is lim-
ited to a support role although the NRP requires federal agencies, includ-
ing DOD, to incorporate the NRP-CIA response requirements into their
own emergency plans.26 When the NRP and NRP-CIA were released, it
was recognized that such a proactive federal response required a Cata-
strophic Incident Supplement ("CIS") to provide detailed and operation-
ally specific instructions to the federal responders, including the military.27
Although a draft CIS was apparently produced before Katrina's landfall,
no final publicly available version could be found at this writing.2"
DOD issued its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support in
June 2005 and its Joint Doctrine on Homeland Security in August 2005.29
In a departure from previous planning documents, DOD anticipated sub-
stantial reliance on National Guard and Reserve forces for domestic mis-
sions.3" Although the new policy signals a more expansive domestic role
for the military, DOD has carefully distinguished its emerging role in
Homeland Defense ("HD") from its role in Homeland Security ("HS"),
the latter being one in which "DOD will serve in a supporting role for
domestic incident management.
31
22. NRP-CIA, supra note 2, at 1.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
25. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 18.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See The Best-Laid Plans, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE (Nov. 1, 2005), available at http://www.
govexec.com/features/1105-01/1105-Olslsl.htm.
29. DEP'T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT (2005); DEP'T OF
DEF. & JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DOD JOINT DOCTRINE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, JOINT PUBLICATION
No. 3-26 (2005).
30. DEP'T OF DEF. & JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DOD JOINT DOCTRINE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
JOINT PUBLICATION No. 4-1-4-16 (2005).
31. DEP'T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT viii (2005).
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During disaster response operations, National Guard forces by default
operate under the control of state governors. 32 The National Guard Bu-
reau ("NGB"), a federal entity, has responsibility for developing and im-
plementing coordination policies affecting Army and Air Force Guard
personnel and serves as the conduit for communications between active
duty and Guard and Reserve Army and Air Force units. 33 The NGB chief
does not command the National Guard personnel, although he is responsi-
ble for National Guard Military Support to Civil Authorities programs gen-
erally.34 The commanding officer of NORTHCOM is responsible for
command of the federal military response to a disaster-active duty forces
and federalized Guard.35
Thus, military support during emergencies, including natural disasters,
may be provided by state or federal military troops. The traditional, de-
fault support comes from State National Guard units, deployed at the be-
hest of the governors. State and local first responders-police, fire, and
emergency medical staff-assume the lead response role by virtue of their
proximity to the crisis.36 Local and state governments also have emergency
management plans that mirror the NRP to varying degrees. 37 Differences
among state and local plans may be significant, although the basic struc-
tures for emergency response are similar throughout the states.38
By participating in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
("EMAC"), governors may also activate State National Guard personnel
and send them to another state that requires assistance during a disaster.3"
The EMAC was approved by Congress in 1996 and was patterned on a
southern regional effort developed after frustration with the response to
Hurricane Andrew in 1992."° Administered by the National Emergency
Management Association, (the states' professional emergency managers),
the EMAC provides the legal basis for state-to-state sharing of military re-
sources. 41 The governor of an affected state (through his state's adjutant
general) commands both in-state and EMAC-deployed National Guard
units from other states.42
In addition, the Militia Clause of the Constitution authorizes the use of
the National Guard under continuing control of the governors but serving
32. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 41.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 40.
36. Id. at 45.
37. Id. at 45-46.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 46.
40. Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996).
41. Id.; KEITH BEA, FEDERAL STAFFORD ACT DISASTER ASSISTANCE: PRESIDENTIAL DECLARA-
TIONS, ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES, AND FUNDING, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REP. No. RL33053 at
3-4 (2005).
42. Id. at 1-5.
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the federal government to "execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insur-
rections and repel invasions."43 For example, when the President re-
quested deployment of National Guard personnel to our nation's airports
after the September 11 attacks, the Guard forces were controlled by the
governors at federal expense and ordered to perform federally prescribed
operations-in that instance to assure air security and compliance with fed-
eral commerce and aviation laws." Under a federal law, National Guard
personnel then serve in what is commonly referred to as "Title 32 status."45
Governors may request that National Guard personnel continue to be di-
rected by state commanders while they receive federal pay and benefits for
performance of the federally assigned role.46 Alternatively, Title 32 status
may be requested of the Secretary of Defense by the governors, allowing
them to equalize the terms and conditions of service when a multi-state
deployment or response occurs.4 7
Federal military response to disasters may consist of active duty units
or Reserve or National Guard personnel when called into federal service
by the President.48 So deployed, those forces remain under control of the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and military commanders. 49 The use
of the federal military for disaster relief is specifically contemplated by the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. ° This
law permits the President to use any agency, including DOD, to assist state
and local governments in disaster relief operations or specifically to deploy
the active duty military to perform work essential for the preservation of
life and property.51 When a looming disaster is likely to overwhelm state
and local response capabilities, the Stafford Act authorizes the President to
respond to a governor's request for assistance by declaring an "emer-
gency"-triggering federal grants and assistance in distributing food and
medicine-or a "major disaster"-enabling more sweeping federal support
to state and local efforts.52
Although the President may also declare a Stafford Act "emergency"
(but not a "major disaster") unilaterally, authorized assistance in such cir-
cumstances is limited in scope and amount ($5 million).53 Under the Staf-
ford Act, the military normally responds to requests for support from a
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
44. MAJ. GEN. TIMOTHY J. LOWENBERG, THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL GUARD ASS'N OF THE U.S. (2005), available at http://
www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000457/primer%20fin.pdf?False.
45. 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) (1980).
46. LOWENBERG, supra note 44, at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3.
49. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2002 & Supp. 2006).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 5192 (Supp. 2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170(b) (2002 & Supp. 2006).
52. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 18.
53. Id.
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governor but may provide, under its "immediate response authority," assis-
tance to local civil authorities without waiting for the request or prior ap-
proval of the President if the action is necessary to save lives, prevent
suffering, or mitigate great property loss under imminent and serious
conditions.54
When a federal military role in disaster response is contemplated,
DOD appoints a Defense Coordinating Officer ("DCO") at the request of
DHS, and the DCO becomes the operational contact for NORTHCOM
and the designated Joint Task Force Commander.55 NORTHCOM consti-
tutes a joint task force for disaster response from forces assigned from the
service branches. 6 When a request for military support comes to DOD
from DHS, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
("ASDHD") evaluates it and, upon approval, forwards the request to the
Joint Director of Military Support, who provides orders to
NORTHCOM.57
This synopsis shows that the NRP, other planning documents, and a
few laws, along with our constitutional structure, present an imprecise
blueprint for the roles played by military personnel in disaster response.
The plans and laws do not provide all the answers as to who is in charge of
the forces once deployed. State-deployed National Guard units are the de-
fault first military responders, and they may be supplemented by units from
other states under E*MAC arrangements.5 8 However, the National Guard
may be federalized by the President, and active duty military may also be
deployed in response to a domestic disaster.59 An unresolved tension per-
sists between a potential need for active duty military when state and local
officials cannot manage the crisis and the continuing presumption that a
governor must decide whether to ask for federal support and when to do
so. Even the most forward-leaning and tailored plan-the NRP-CIA-as-
sumes that state and local response authorities will know how to integrate
federal assets that arrive without having been requested. With these loose
ends, it is hardly surprising that the military portion of the response to Ka-
trina was not a model of efficiency.
III. KATRINA-WHAT HAPPENED?
As part of regular preparations for the hurricane season, Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld issued a standing order on August 19, 2005, that allowed
NORTHCOM to deploy installations and DCO in support of FEMA wher-
ever needed.6" Units from U.S. Joint Forces Command followed with in-
structions on which units would deploy in support of NORTHCOM and
54. DEP'T OF DEF., MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES, DIRECTIVE No. 3025.1, 7-8
(1993).
55. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 40.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 31-32.
59. Id. at 39-40.
60. Id. at 65-66.
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FEMA. 61 Although NORTHCOM began tracking what would become
Hurricane Katrina on August 23, and initial relief actions were put in mo-
tion by NORTHCOM on August 26, most pre-landfall activities consisted
of evacuating active military units from the projected path of the storm.62
At landfall, DOD sought a damage assessment for DOD facilities and
NORTHCOM issued alerts in anticipation of requests for assistance.63
The pre-landfall preparation for Katrina also involved FEMA and its
disaster-related relief agencies, along with state and local officials. Be-
tween the August 24 forecast of Katrina's strength and path and its landfall
on August 29, FEMA deployed more resources to the landfall states than it
had positioned prior to any event in the agency's history.64
In Mississippi, the National Guard was activated on August 26 and the
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency ("MEMA") opened its Emer-
gency Operations Center on August 27.65 As Mississippi's Guard troops
deployed and received orders from MEMA, emphasizing Gulf Coast "hur-
ricane strike" squads, Adjutant General Major General Harold A. Cross
decided by August 28 that forces from outside the state would be re-
quired.66 Cross sought support from the EMAC, and NGB headquarters
sent officers to coordinate the deployment of out-of-state troops who
promptly arrived in coastal counties and at headquarters in Jackson,
Mississippi. 67
In Louisiana, Governor Blanco requested, and President Bush de-
clared, a Stafford Act emergency for the state on August 27 and a major
disaster on August 28.68 State emergency management agencies and parish
and Red Cross groups also prepared in advance of the storm.69 The Louisi-
ana National Guard deployed troops and began stocking shelters with sup-
plies on August 26 (including the Superdome in New Orleans), and
Adjutant General Landreneau made requests for additional Guard troops
through the EMAC beginning on August 28.70 The National Guard Bu-
reau also worked in anticipation of Katrina to pre-position staff to poten-
tially affected states and to coordinate needs for assistance from Gulf
States' adjutant generals.71 In several pre-landfall instances, NGB ar-
ranged for assistance for states through the EMAC and did not deploy fed-
eral assets.72
61. Id. at 66.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 59.
65. Id. at 60.
66. Id. at 61.
67. Id.
68. Louisiana: Emergency and Related Determinations, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,238 (Sept. 7, 2005).
69. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 64.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 66.
72. Id. at 67.
[VOL. 26:75
ROLE OF MILITARY IN DISASTER RESPONSE
Despite the pre-positioning of FEMA assets in the Gulf States, the
storm quickly overtook the federal preparedness efforts, and state and lo-
cal resources were swamped-some literally and others figuratively.
73
Even after President Bush declared a federal emergency on Saturday, Au-
gust 27, two days prior to landfall, DHS did not follow suit by declaring the
predicted Category Four or Five hurricane an INS until August 30. 7' DHS
Secretary Michael Chertoff then appointed FEMA Director Michael
Brown as the Principal Federal Officer ("PFO") for the federal response to
Katrina. Even then, Secretary Chertoff declined to trigger the NRP-CIA,
which would have directed the federal response posture to a proactive
mode of operations. In Louisiana, the local government in New Orleans
was obliterated by Katrina, and state government was severely limited.
Thus, the expected "pull" system of disaster response-states pulling the
federal assets as needed-could not function, and FEMA effectively was
tasked with commanding the response. FEMA Director Brown was not
prepared to build an incident command structure prior to landfall, and he
struggled to complete such a scheme even weeks after landfall.75
Because the INS designation was made a full day after landfall, only
then did the NRP call for DOD to enable NORTHCOM to establish Joint
Task Force Katrina to coordinate the federal military response to Katrina.76
Even if the NRP-CIA had been implemented at the same time that the INS
was declared, the federal military response would have been delayed. The
request for military assistance had to originate with Governor Blanco and
be transmitted to the lead federal agency, FEMA.7 7 The request then went
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was reviewed by the ASDHD,
and was forwarded, after approval, to the Joint Director of Military Sup-
port within the Joint Staff, who, in turn, provided orders to
NORTHCOM.78 Because it took nearly three days for the request from
Governor Blanco for active duty military support to be communicated to
JTF-Katrina, it took until September 1 for JTF-Katrina to deploy 3000 ac-
tive duty military personnel inside the affected area.79 DOD support was
spearheaded by General Russell Honor6, commander of JTF-Katrina, who
arrived on August 31. Navy and Air Force personnel began to arrive on
September 1 followed by Army units on September 2. Federal personnel
joined in search and rescue operations-sometimes with State National
Guard, Coast Guard, and local law enforcement personnel. DOD also
took over basic logistics distribution functions when FEMA was unable to
keep up with the demands.8°
73. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 33-41.
74. Id. at 41.
75. Id. at 41-42.
76. Id. at 42.
77. Id. at 40.
78. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 40.
79. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 43.
80. Id.
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By September 5, more than 14,000 military personnel were in the
area.A Yet the initial military support in response to the storm was too
little, too late, and too disorganized. There was no effective coordination
between active duty and Guard forces, and the separate commands could
not communicate effectively because of equipment interoperability.8 2
Early in the JTF-Katrina response, NORTHCOM did not know what
Guard forces were deployed or where they were. 3 The Louisiana Guard
did not know where JTF-Katrina forces were or what they were doing. 4 In
Keystone cops-like fashion, some forces bumped heads at redundant as-
signments while other central tasks were not performed." FEMA's re-
quests for active duty military support were made without knowledge of
what state Guard units were doing. 6
"Most of the Guard response to Katrina came from outside [the af-
fected states]," as NGB served as the clearinghouse for information relayed
from adjutant generals of deploying states to Louisiana and Mississippi. 7
The need for out-of-state forces increased because those two most affected
states already had thousands of Guard personnel deployed for other mis-
sions when Katrina struck. 8 Although the number of out-of-state Guard
troops eventually grew to over 40,000, mobilization plans were developed
on-the-fly during the crisis.8 9 When Superdome bus evacuations began on
September 1, only 1600 out-of-state troops augmented a like number of
State Guard personnel.9 ° Similarly, considerable confusion surrounded the
tardy arrival of federal military forces.91 After the President visited the
region on September 2 and met with Governor Blanco, 7000 active duty
troops were ordered to the region the next day.92
The National Guard forces in the affected states were quickly called
up and deployed by the governors-some before landfall and others when
the storm hit on August 29. 9' Additional Guard support was facilitated by
NGB.94 As early as August 30, Guard units from Louisiana and Mississippi
were augmented by units from nine other states.9" Although communica-
tion and protocols were set and functioned reasonably well for these state
81. Id.
82. Id. at 43, 55.
83. Id. at 43.
84. See generally FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 183-231.
85. Id.
86. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 55.
87. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE KATRINA: BETTER PLANS AND
EXERCISES NEEDED TO GUIDE THE MILITARY'S RESPONSE TO CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS, No. GAO-
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Guard units in the aftermath of Katrina, NORTHCOM lacked a compati-
ble system for communication between DOD entities on the ground and
State-deployed Guard units.96
By August 31, the need for a unified military command was more than
apparent. Federal officials discussed federalizing the National Guard with
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco.97 Although the President may have
been able to federalize the Guard on his own authority, for political rea-
sons and to avoid drawing attention to the civil unrest in New Orleans, the
White House determined that it was preferable to have the request come
from Governor Blanco.98 She refused. 99 Eventually, President Bush of-
fered Blanco a "Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Authorization,
Consent and Use of Dual Status Commander for JTF-Katrina," which
would have made General Honor6 a member of the Louisiana National
Guard.10 The Guard force then would have remained under Blanco's con-
trol and Honor6's command. 1 1 Honor6 would have worn two hats-first,
as commander of U.S. forces in the task force under the President; and
second, the commander of the Louisiana Guard under Governor Blanco.1
0 2
Blanco declined this arrangement as well. 0 3
Management and direction of the various State Guard units became
complex even though the EMAC made the basic deployments and initial
communications straightforward.'0 4 Because each state's units were on
state active duty and subject to the rules of their states, administrative
quagmires were inevitable. 05 Within a few days, the governors of the three
principally affected states wrote to the Secretary of Defense asking that the
Guard forces deployed from all states be placed under Title 32 status,
which would allow continued control by the governors but would substitute
a uniform federal pay and benefits system. °6 DOD approved the request
on September 7, retroactive to August 29.107
In and around New Orleans, deployed Guard units helped restore law
and order in support of the exhausted New Orleans Police Department.
However, "[t]he military did not plan for the integration of deployed forces
from different commands during a disaster response operation."'0 8 Existing
Louisiana plans contemplated absorbing up to 300 troops per day into
State Guard command, but more than 20,000 Guard forces from other
96. Id.
97. Id. at 206.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
99. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 207.
100. Id. at 206.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 206-07.
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states arrived in Louisiana. 10 9 While the commands of these forces were
coordinated, they were not integrated-there was no unified command.11 °
The Mississippi National Guard performed well. Adjutant General
Harold A. Cross was clearly prepared for the wrath of Katrina.1 1' By land-
fall, he had deployed approximately 4500 Mississippi Guard personnel in
search and rescue, reconnaissance, and other support activities. 112 Through
cooperation with NGB, the state force was enhanced by nearly 12,000
Guard personnel from 36 states under EMAC agreements-most having
arrived in Mississippi within 96 hours.1 3
All in all, the State Guard forces performed admirably, as did the fed-
eral forces, upon arrival. However, according to the ASDHD, Paul Mc-
Hale, coordination and communication between Guard and federal active
duty forces was done, if at all, "'on the fly'-albeit by superb leaders."
'1 14
McHale acknowledged that Guard plans were not integrated with DOD
plans, even though NGB provided JTF-Katrina with timely and accurate
reports.1 5 Likewise, Guard commanders did not coordinate with the fed-
eral forces at NORTHCOM for the most part." 6 Mississippi was an excep-
tion, apparently because of the strong personal relationships between
Generals Cross and Honor6, who spoke daily during the crisis. 17 As for
DHS coordination with DOD, there was no DHS document or plan that
would have advised DOD of the requirements for military assistance to
civilian authorities during a crisis. 18
Later in September, after the resignation of the FEMA administrator
and several days of finger pointing by city, state, and federal officials, Presi-
dent Bush suggested that he and Congress should consider whether to
change federal law so that emergency response in significant natural disas-
ters could be led and coordinated by the military. 9 In discussing propos-
als that would necessarily reduce the authority of DHS and FEMA in
disaster response, NORTHCOM commander Admiral Timothy Keating
recommended that DOD be given "complete control" for response to di-
sasters like Katrina: "We have to think the unthinkable may be possible,
even probable.' 120 In other words, if those now in charge cannot get it
right, let us give the job to the institution that can-DOD.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 210-11.
112. Id. at 211.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 218.
115. Id. at 218-19.
116. Id. at 219.
117. Id. at 219-20.
118. Id. at 203.
119. J. VandeHei & J. White, Bush Urges Shift in Relief Responsibilities, WASH. POST, Sept. 26,
2005, at A12.
120. Ann Imse, Proposal Would Use Military in Disasters, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 26, 2005, at
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State officials and National Guard leaders reacted strongly. Florida
Governor Jeb Bush wrote:
As the Governor of a state that has been hit by seven hurri-
canes and two tropical storms in the past 13 months, I can
say with certainty that federalizing emergency response to
catastrophic events would be a disaster as bad as Hurricane
Katrina .... Before Congress considers a larger, direct fed-
eral role, it needs to hold communities and states accounta-
ble for properly preparing for the inevitable storms to
come. 121
Washington State Adjutant General Timothy Lowenberg said that the
NORTHCOM proposal would "bring about a fundamental change in the
emergency governance of states impacted by large scale disasters ... [and
could be likened to] a policy of domestic regime change. ' 122 Montana
Governor Brian Schweitzer suggested the proposition would "allow the
military .. . to effectively do an end-run coup on civilian government[.]
' 123
As General Lowenberg pointed out, existing open-source federal laws and
planning documents prescribe ample opportunities for federal coordination
with state officials and military commanders during a disaster. 24
Regardless of whether the President's suggestions and the Keating
proposal would bring about "domestic regime change" or an "end-run
coup," the Administration proposed and Congress has begun to consider
statutory changes that would federalize disaster response in significant
ways. Based in part on proposals from DOD, the House in May 2006 and
the Senate in June 2006 passed versions of the Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007 that follow different paths toward a greater DOD role
in disaster response. 25 At this writing, a conference committee has been
named to reconcile differences in the bills. The proposed legislative re-
forms will be assessed briefly in Part IV.
IV. THE FEDERALISM MINUET
A. What Is at Stake?
The Katrina episode is not the first time that confusion and frustration
have surrounded questions regarding in which domestic activities federal
121. Jeb Bush, Think Locally on Relief, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at A19.
122. See E-mail from Major General Timothy Lowenberg, Adjutant General, Washington Military
Department, to The Adjutant Generals (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2005/
12/lowenl03105.html [hereinafter E-mail from Major General Timothy Lowenberg].
123. Terje Langeland, Warriors, Rescuers, Spooks: The U.S. Military's Growing Involvement in
Domestic Affairs, THE COLO. SPRINGS INDEP. WKLY., Dec. 8-14, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.
csindy.com/csindy/2005-12-08/cover.html.
124. See Email from Major General Timothy Lowenberg, supra note 122.
125. G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R.
5122, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. REP. No. 109-452 (2006); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2007, S. 2766, 109th Cong. (2006); S. REP. No. 109-254 (2006).
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active duty military forces may engage-and according to what rules. In-
deed, debate and uncertainty has accompanied the use of federal troops in
domestic affairs many times, including during the Wounded Knee standoff
in South Dakota in 1973, the Los Angeles riots in 1992, and pursuit of the
Washington, D.C. snipers in 2002.126 While these and other such contro-
versies have highlighted legal disputes about the limits of the federal mili-
tary role, our laws permit military support to civil authorities in most
circumstances including disaster response. The oft-unspoken subtext of
these controversies is federalism and a fear of military dominance in civil
matters.
To understand why officials have been reluctant to assign lead agency
status to active duty military personnel in domestic disaster response, the
relevant background federalism values are worth recalling. First, the nec-
essary placement of state governors as commanders of State Guard units
provides an additional buffer between the uniformed military and the peo-
ple-fifty-one commanders in chief, in effect. Although turning to DOD is
not the same thing as giving over an operation to military control (civilians
are in charge of DOD decision making), most Americans may view DOD
and the military as one and the same. Second, federalism assures that the
decisions themselves-to commit military resources to a domestic crisis-
will be made by officials closest to those most likely to be directly affected
by the military deployment.
Putting the military in charge in a domestic natural disaster cuts
against our cultural grain. The United States has been proudly unique in
entrusting law enforcement to civilian forces, managed and controlled by
civilians. At the same time, when the Framers of our Constitution sketched
out a new federal government and gave it extensive national powers, they
also preserved the background prerogatives of state and local governments
to care for the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. 127 Our federal
system has helped cement control over and accountability for law enforce-
ment and disaster response activities and decisions at the lowest levels of
government closest to the operations being conducted. Meanwhile, our
revolutionary and constitutional heritage, fed by experiences in England
and with the English military in the colonies, led to the creation of civilian
and military spheres in government and to the unequivocal subordination
of the military to civilian authority.1
28
Although laws and traditions have made military presence in the
homeland exceptional, the domestic use of troops has been a feature of
government since President Washington called out the militia to put down
126. See generally JENNIFER ELSEA, THE POSSE COMrTATUs ACr AND RELATED MATTERS: A
SKETCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REP. No. RS20590 (2005).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
128. See William C. Banks, Troops Defending the Homeland: The Posse Comitatus Act and the
Legal Environment for a Military Role in Domestic Counter Terrorism, 14 TERRORISM & POL. VIO-
LENCE 1 (2002).
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the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794.129 Since then, federal troops have been
occasionally activated to help keep the peace, aid local governments in nat-
ural disasters, and enforce federal and state laws. 130 Federal involvement
in disaster response began in 1803 when Congress supported the recovery
of Portsmouth, NH, from a devastating fire.131 Until the 1970s, the federal
response to disasters was episodic, and, as more federal response agencies
were created after the New Deal, the response function was fragmented
among a variety of agencies. When FEMA was created by President
Carter by executive order in 1979, the fragmentation of federal disaster and
emergency relief was ended. 32 The contemporary Stafford Act is a more
sophisticated version of the 1803 law, designed now, as then, to supplement
state and local resources.
The Constitution contemplates that Congress may call for a military
response to extraordinary events in the states (invasion, domestic violence,
insurrection), and the President may deploy federal troops as Commander
in Chief to defend the homeland in the event of terrorist attack or similar
threat to national security or to assist in disaster response in fulfilling his
duty to faithfully execute the laws. 33
The origins of our legal presumption against federal military involve-
ment in civilian law enforcement may be traced to another chapter in En-
glish history. In feudal England, the posse comitatus-literally, the power
of the county-could be invoked when the sheriff issued the "hue and cry"
to members of the shire to assist as part of a posse in pursuit of lawbreak-
ers.134 The practice of forming posses to assist in law enforcement crossed
the Atlantic, where they were employed in the colonies and then in the
states.
135
However, involvement of members of the military in posses created
controversy. In the years just before and after the Civil War, federal troops
were sometimes deployed as part of civilian posses-to enforce the Fugi-
tive Slave Act, to implement Reconstruction laws, and to assist federal
marshals at the polls in the 1876 presidential election.1 36 In 1876, when it
appeared that the eventual victor, Rutherford B. Hayes, won by one electo-
ral vote over Democrat Samuel Tilden, disputes arose over votes in South
Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida, where it was alleged that the military
presence intimidated voters into voting for the Republican candidates.
37
When the final tally showed that Tilden had won the election in the popu-
lar vote, a political deal was made whereby southern Democrats agreed to
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., COPING WITH CATASTROPHE: BUILDING AN EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO MEET PEOPLE'S NEEDS IN NATURAL AND MANMADE DISASTERS 10 (1993).
132. Exec. Order No. 12,127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,367 (Mar. 31, 1979); Exec. Order No. 12,148, 44 Fed.
Reg. 43,239 (July 20, 1979).
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; art. II, § 2, cl. 1; art. IV, § 4.
134. Banks, supra note 128, at 3-4
135. Id.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id. at 6.
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deliver electoral votes sufficient to hand the presidency to Hayes in return
for a promise that federal troops would leave the southern states.
138
Less than two years later, the Posse Comitatus Act ("PCA") was en-
acted. 39 The PCA makes criminal military participation in executing the
laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or by Congress. How-
ever, the organized militia-State National Guard personnel-are not sub-
ject to the PCA.14 0 In addition, over time statutory exceptions to the PCA
have given the President considerable discretion to deploy federal troops
domestically following a natural disaster or other emergency. The Stafford
Act is not an exception to the PCA because it does not call for a military
role in law enforcement. However, the "immediate response authority"
embedded in DOD regulations has been cited alongside the Stafford Act as
federal military disaster response authority, as it was following the bomb-
ing of the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995, when military personnel
supplied medivac equipment, ambulances, bomb detection dog teams, and
otherwise assisted in evacuation, restoration of public services, and traffic
control. 4 '
A range of statutory exceptions to the PCA have been enacted to as-
sist in drug interdiction, domestic counterterrorism activities, and other law
enforcement activities related to homeland defense, and thus are inapplica-
ble to disaster response.1 42 A more pertinent exception, the Insurrection
Act, dates from 1792 and permits the President to use the military to sup-
press "an insurrection" at the request of a state legislature or governor, or
to federalize the National Guard or deploy active duty military when "un-
lawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages ... make it impractica-
ble to enforce the laws of the United States .... ,143 The Insurrection Act
was invoked to break the Pullman Strike in 1894, to help integrate public
schools and universities, to control racial unrest, and to enforce a variety of
federal and state laws. 1 4 4 Before exercising the Insurrection Act authority,
the President must issue a Proclamation to Disperse and an executive order
authorizing the Secretary of Defense to use military force to suppress the
activities described in the proclamation.145 The Insurrection Act could
have been invoked by the President during the post-Katrina unrest in New
Orleans.
One virtue of State-controlled Guard units in a disaster like Katrina is
that such personnel are not restricted from enforcing state and local laws
138. Id.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
140. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hutch-
ings, 127 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 1997).
141. 32 C.F.R. § 185.4e (2005); Jim Winthrop, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Immediate Response
Authority and Other Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA), ARmy LAW., July 1997, at 3.
142. See William C. Banks, The Normalization of Homeland Security After September 11: The
Role of the Military in Counterterrorism Preparedness and Response, 64 LA. L. REv. 735, 742-48 (2004).
143. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332 (2000).
144. Banks, supra note 128, at 18-19.
145. 10 U.S.C. § 334 (2006).
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by the PCA, however significant those restrictions are under the circum-
stances. Given the political considerations that led the President not to in-
voke the Insurrection Act, the Katrina experience only reinforced the
importance of the State-controlled National Guard during natural disasters
in maintaining order, coordinating rescue and relief operations, and provid-
ing logistical support. The Guard units performed well, assisted in particu-
lar by EMAC arrangements that permitted substantial contributions from
many states based on the compact. Still, the uncertainties sustained by the
fact that the Guard may serve the governors or be federalized and then
serve under command of active duty forces on the President's say-so were
important in the Katrina crisis-especially in the pre-landfall and immedi-
ate post-landfall days. The details of the discussions, debates, and commu-
nications about this matter and related issues inside the Bush
Administration and between the Administration and Governor Blanco's
office may never be known. Reportedly, after the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel advised the President that active duty federal mili-
tary troops could be sent to Louisiana, even over Governor Blanco's objec-
tion, the President sought to avoid the perception that he seized command
from a female Democratic governor.146 What is known is that the decision
about the active duty military and National Guard status complicated the
response to Katrina and almost certainly slowed the response and affected
its quality. The coordination and command implications were apparent.
In a crisis like Katrina, where multiple jurisdictions and levels of gov-
ernment were affected, did continuing state control of the Guard interfere
with effective response to the disaster? Would federalizing the Guard in
the early going have increased the efficiency of the relief effort by central-
izing command and resource allocation decisions? If federalized, the
Guard would either have had to refrain from law enforcement activities or
the President would have had to invoke an available statutory exception to
the PCA, such as the Insurrection Act, which may have inflamed local pas-
sions and would have amounted to a public concession that things were out
of control in New Orleans.
In my view, the existing arrangements can be made to work effectively
in disaster response. What was lacking, particularly in Louisiana, is what
matters most in disaster response-unity of command, not necessarily a
single command. There is no reason that the state and federal military per-
sonnel necessary for response to a disaster cannot be coordinated and their
operations integrated through carefully conceived, implemented, and prac-
ticed unity of command. In addition to the highly flexible EMAC arrange-
ments, the possibility of Title 32 status-state control in service of a
federally prescribed operation with uniform federal pay and benefits-also
makes state control more manageable during a crisis.
As it happens, the NRP only exacerbates the federalism tension by
failing to spell out whether, when, and how federal personnel will step into
146. Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2005, at Al.
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a crisis when state and local officials are overwhelmed. 47 Although the
NRP-CIA acknowledges that state and local resources may be insufficient
in some situations, it does not say that the federal response should assume
the lead-even in the direst circumstances. The Stafford Act permits the
President to send federal resources to a crisis in a state independent of the
NRP, but grants the President only limited discretion and permits the mili-
tary units to act on their own only temporarily pursuant to "immediate
response authority.
'" 148
During Katrina, DOD response was tardy and tentative because DHS
Secretary Chertoff was slow in declaring an INS. The federal military sup-
port, when it arrived, was mostly effective, enabled significantly by the
leadership of General Honor6 and his personal relationships with state ci-
vilian and military leaders.' 49 Although NGB performed ably in coordinat-
ing State Guard responses in the affected states, DOD had no protocols for
the State Guard response activities to be shared with active duty mili-
tary. 150 The State Guard likewise had no plans for integrating operations
with DOD forces.' The proposal during the crisis to fashion some unity
of command in Louisiana that would dual-hat General Honord-to com-
mand federal troops under the President and Louisiana forces under the
Governor-was declined by Governor Blanco.1
5 2
V. SMOOTHING OUT THE WRINKLES
A. Integration, Coordination, and Unity of Command
One of the strengths of the military-experience with command and
control-has been a chronic weakness in disaster response. DHS improved
the federal system of command and control for disaster response on paper
by creating a new ICS, along with the NRP and NIMS, to promote unity of
command among authorities in disaster response. 15 3 Yet the system broke
down repeatedly during and after Katrina's landfall, within and between
the levels of government. While part of the problem was attributable to
interoperable communications, part was also due to insufficient or, in some
cases, non-existent plans for coordination between and within govern-
ments. Even the military responders were to blame as separate commands
for State-deployed National Guard and active duty forces failed to compe-
tently communicate or coordinate.
In New Orleans, the National Guard lost command and control when
its Jackson Barracks flooded and had to be abandoned.' 54 Until its opera-
tions center could be set up in an aboveground parking garage at the
147. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 202.
148. Id. at 31, 39.
149. Id. at 204-05.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 219.
152. Id. at 206-07.
153. Id. at 184.
154. Id. at 185.
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Superdome, the National Guard had no command and control over their
personnel and could not coordinate with other agencies involved in the
relief.'55 In addition to a flooded operations center, National Guard and
New Orleans Police Department officials differed on who was responsible
for command and control at the Superdome.' 5 6 The Guard said it was
there in support of the police, and the police said that the Guard was in
charge.157 When a FEMA official arrived at the Superdome on August 31,
he found "nobody in charge, and no unified command." '158
A command and control problem of a very different sort presented
itself when officials simply ignored unified command systems that were in
place. In New Orleans, State Coordinating Officer ("SCO") Jeff Smith
maintained (against criticisms from federal officials) that the State EOC
was fully functional during the crisis and stated that when JFT-Katrina
commander General Honor6 appeared on the scene, he operated "inde-
pendently with little regard" for the unified command that was in place.'59
General Honor6 directed his forces from the JTF-Katrina command ship-
the USS Iwo Jima, docked at the New Orleans pier-where he coordinated
with local parishes, accepted assignments from them, and did not follow
federal command rules nor state command instructions. a6 ° Although Ho-
nord correctly observed that the chain of command did not work as
planned during the Katrina crisis, his independent decision making exacer-
bated problems of unity of command in the federal response.
16 1
A third example of failed unity of command played out in attempts to
evacuate the Superdome. On August 30, FEMA arranged with the Louisi-
ana National Guard to evacuate the Superdome using Chinook and
Blackhawk helicopters. 62 Although the planned thirty hour evacuation
was ready for implementation on Wednesday morning (August 31), Gover-
nor Blanco instead ordered Adjutant General Landreneau to arrange for
active duty military support for response operations with General Honor6
of JTF-Katrina.' 63 FEMA was unaware of this exchange, which occurred
outside unified command, and the JTF-Katrina evacuation operation took
place twenty-four hours later than would have occurred under the original
National Guard/FEMA plan.'64 Because Governor Blanco rejected fed-
eral offers to place the Guard and active duty military under the same com-
mand, the latter arrived later than otherwise would have been the case and




158. Id. at 186 (quoting Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells, Deputy Fed. Coordi-
nating Officer, FEMA, in Baton Rouge, La. (Nov. 9, 2005)).
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In the end, the complaints of missed efficiencies and complicated coor-
dination due to state and local control over their own assets in responding
to a disaster missed the mark. In our federal system, like other vertical
structures, it is too easy for one level of government to place blame up or
down the hierarchy. The Katrina experience revealed considerable confu-
sion at all levels of government about who was in charge and about which
response entities could and should do what. Still, some basics were clear
then and remain clear today. The first responders in any crisis will be local,
including local police and fire units. Their leaders know the emergency
response drill, and they know who to contact in the federal government
and how to make those contacts when they need help. Their support
comes from FEMA, the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), and the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")-not from DOD.
Inserting DOD as a central player and command center in domestic disas-
ter response would undo a system that, for the most part, works pretty well.
True, the state and local relationships with FEMA and CDC/HHS are
based on normal, day-to-day requests for assistance and not on Katrina-
like emergencies. Nevertheless, inserting DOD into an emergency as the
command agency would unravel the relationships that have been devel-
oped between the local and federal personnel and leaders. FEMA per-
formed poorly during Katrina, but fixing FEMA would do less violence to
the values of federalism and would be more responsive to the needs for
federal support to states and communities in disaster response.
Although Admiral Keating of NORTHCOM talked of giving active
duty commanders "complete authority" for disaster response, other mili-
tary officials (including General Steven Blum, commander of NGB) recog-
nized the need to maintain state sovereignty in disaster response.166
During the storm crisis, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida declined addi-
tional active duty military assistance. The active duty units pre-positioned
in Mississippi operated effectively alongside the Mississippi Guard, perhaps
due to the effective state military leadership and his relationship with fed-
eral counterparts.
167
The drama played out in Louisiana. The scenes of Governor Blanco,
Mayor Nagin, DHS Secretary Chertoff, FEMA Director Brown, and Presi-
dent Bush wringing hands, huddling in groups, wondering where the help
was and when it was coming, and generally appearing defensive and reac-
tive played like a script for dysfunctional government. Governor Blanco
had to decide, after advice from Mayor Nagin and others, whether to re-
quest federalized Guard. She knew the consequences of that choice. The
President had to decide whether to federalize the Guard or send in active
duty forces under his statutory authority. He knew the consequences of
those choices. Because Secretary Chertoff had not declared Katrina an
INS until two days after landfall, the entire federal response-civilian and
military-was playing catch up from the beginning.
166. Id. at 221.
167. Id. at 219-20.
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The initial deployment of active duty troops to the affected areas by
President Bush was compromised by at least the potential application of
the PCA; because the Insurrection Act was not invoked, the federal troops
could not engage in law enforcement, so their role was limited to search
and rescue missions and supporting medical relief. Although the President
could have avoided the posse comitatus problem by invoking the Insurrec-
tion Act, the inevitable drawing of attention to the unrest in New Orleans
likely caused that option to be dropped from serious consideration.
168
When the President sought the compromise outcome for federal military
involvement-dual-hatting General Honord in Louisiana by agreement
with Governor Blanco-the offer was refused, and Honor6 continued to
command only active duty forces in the area. 169 Meanwhile, the Louisiana
Guard held command of its own personnel and borrowed Guard forces
from other states. Although Governor Blanco's refusal appeared political,
she likely was advised (correctly) that General Honor6 was unfamiliar with
state procedures, personnel, and operations. His command there might
have made things worse, not better.
That is not to say that Louisiana officials had things under control-far
from it. The Louisiana plan to integrate Guard units from outside the state
under the EMAC would accommodate up to 300 new personnel per day.'7 °
During Katrina, more than 20,000 Guard troops arrived on the scene, 8500
on a single day.171 Command and control problems were compounded by
the sheer numbers and the range of states involved. Practically speaking,
Governor Blanco's decision to maintain separate state and federal chains
of command simplified the command structure, and General Honor6 man-
aged as best he could through personal contacts with state officials. Even
within Louisiana and further inside New Orleans, geographic and political
or legal boundaries are not one and the same, and the various military
commands and units had difficulties coordinating with local responders and
police and fire personnel inside and outside New Orleans.1
72
Even NORTHCOM Commander Admiral Keating later acknowl-
edged the many advantages of a State Guard command during a domestic
crisis, including:
(1) the overwhelming majority of forces that respond to di-
sasters are/will be National Guard who will usually be on
the scene in a state active duty status before DOD is re-
quested to respond; (2) the [National Guard] is familiar with
the local area and the local culture; (3) the [National Guard]
usually has close ties with first responders such as local and
168. See Linda J. Demaine & Brian Rosen, Process Dangers of Military Involvement in Civil Law
Enforcement: Rectifying the Posse Comitatus Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEOIS. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 238-39 (2005).
169. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 206-07.
170. GAO REPORT, supra note 87, at 26.
171. Id.
172. See generally FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 185-94.
2006]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
state law enforcement, fire departments, etc; and (4) the lo-
cal community knows and relies upon the [National Guard]
because they are part of the community . . . . [National
Guard] personnel are more likely to have experience work-
ing with local responders than the active component.
173
Keating noted one disadvantage of using a National Guard officer:
"[National Guard] commanders might not be familiar with federal capabili-
ties brought to the table, especially those from Navy and Marines. "174
Thus, at least in his hearing testimony, Admiral Keating became an advo-
cate for the defeat of his earlier proposal.
B. Law Is Not the Problem
In the final analysis, the supposed restrictions of the PCA are a red
herring in the post-Katrina discussion. The law itself simply states a pre-
sumption against military involvement in law enforcement, not a rule
against it. The existing laws provide sufficient authority for any cata-
strophic contingency-from hurricanes to terrorist attacks with weapons of
mass destruction. That is not to say that the availability of troops will abate
such a crisis. Moreover, the PCA presumption applies to enforcing the
laws, not to providing relief personnel and supplies, equipment, or even
medical triage. The NRP and its annexes and incident management system
incorporate DOD participation in support of civilian authorities, and
equivalent DOD planning documents and doctrine articulate, albeit in in-
sufficient detail, just what DOD can do and how they would do it.
Notwithstanding the adequacy of existing legal authorities, the post-
Katrina mantra to federalize disaster response has continued in Congress at
the urging of DOD and with the blessing of the Bush Administration. The
principal mechanism for an expanded federal role chosen for revision is the
statute that governs the President's authority to order Reserve Component
personnel (which includes National Guard personnel) to active duty, com-
monly referred to as Presidential Reserve Call-up authority ("PRC"). 175
The PRC allows the President to activate Reserve or Guard personnel for
up to 270 days for responding to a potential weapon of mass destruction or
terrorist attack that could cause significant loss of life or property.176 How-
ever, the PRC specifically prohibits the President from using this authority
to perform any of the functions related to suppressing insurrection or for
"provid[ing] assistance to either the Federal Government or a State in time
of a serious natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe.
177
In its version of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
the House of Representatives voted to repeal the prohibition and expressly
173. Id. at 222-23 (quoting Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of
Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-NORTHCOM) (2005)).
174. Id.
175. 10 U.S.C. § 12304 (2006).
176. Id.
177. Id. at § 12304(c).
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to permit the President to federalize the Reserves or National Guard for up
to 365 days, without the consent of the governors, in case of "a serious
natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe" inside the United
States. 178 This revision in Guard and Reserve call-up authority would con-
stitute a new exception to the PCA and would extend the President's dis-
cretion to call-up active duty military assistance (in the event of actual or
threatened terrorist attack or use or threatened use of a weapon of mass
destruction) to serious disasters.1 79 Before invoking this authority, the
President must first determine that the response capabilities of local, state,
and federal civilian agencies have been, or will be, exceeded."8 The House
also voted to revise the National Guard Title 32 status to provide explicit
authorization for governors to mobilize Guard forces to support opera-
tional missions taken at the request of the President or Secretary of De-
fense and to perform training operations and missions assigned by the
Secretaries of the Army or Air Force.1 8' Finally, the House approved a
prohibition on gubernatorial use of National Guard units for multi-state
missions because such operations should remain a DHS responsibility.
18 2
At the same time, the House would require the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Homeland Security to report (by April 1, 2007) how DOD and
NORTHCOM will clarify their role in support to DHS and Title 32 Na-
tional Guard units during domestic operations.183
The Senate took a different approach in its version of the Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.184 While following the House's
lead in removing the restriction on PRC of the Reserves and National
Guard in disaster circumstances, instead of an express authorization for
federalizing the Guard in response to disasters, the Senate determined to
place the new federal authority in the Insurrection Act.'8 5 The Senate bill
would amend the Insurrection Act, in the words of the Senate Report "to
clarify and update" the statute, at least in part because "antique terminol-
ogy and the lack of explicit reference to such situations as natural disasters
or terrorist attacks may have contributed to a reluctance to use the armed
forces in situations such as Hurricane Katrina. "186 The title of the Act
would be changed from "Insurrection" to "Enforcement of the Laws to
Restore Public Order," and the triggering circumstances would be "a natu-
ral disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist
attack or incident, or other condition" that hinders execution of the laws to
such an extent that citizens are deprived of constitutional protections and
the state is unable to provide protection, or the laws of the United States
178. G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R.
5122, 109th Cong. § 511 (2006).
179. Id.; 10 U.S.C. § 12304.
180. H.R. 5122; 10 U.S.C. § 12304.
181. H.R. 5122.
182. Id.; 10 U.S.C. § 12304.
183. H.R. 5122; 10 U.S.C. § 12304.
184. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, S. 2766, 109th Cong. (2006).
185. Id. at § 1042.
186. S. REP. No. 109-254, at 384 (2006).
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are being obstructed. 187 This amended mechanism would require the Presi-
dent to notify Congress of his decision to exercise this authority as soon as
practicable and every fourteen days thereafter while the authority is being
exercised.
188
An August 2006 letter signed by all fifty governors objected strongly to
the extension of the President's call-up authority to disasters. 189 The gover-
nors complained that the provision "is very open-ended without a defini-
tion of what constitutes a 'serious' natural or manmade disaster," and they
noted that, should the President need to act where a state has been inca-
pacitated, he has sufficient authority under the current iteration of the In-
surrection Act.1 90 The governors' opposition is well-founded. Presidential
activation of National Guard personnel in disaster-affected states could
lead to stripping governors of control over one of their most important
emergency response assets. Although the Senate bill does not provide such
explicit authority for the President, the proposed amendment to the Insur-
rection Act could be even more invasive of the governors' prerogatives in
permitting the federalized Guard or Reserves to "restore public order" fol-
lowing a disaster in certain circumstances. What does it mean to "restore
public order," and what happens if the President and a governor do not
agree on whether disorder exists during a disaster-induced emergency?
On balance, however, the Senate proposal is probably less onerous for
state prerogatives than the House bill. Both measures require that the
President make some determination of the necessity of federalizing the mil-
itary response. The House bill leaves untouched a requirement in the law
that no activation order can be issued "unless the President determines that
the requirements for responding to an emergency ... have exceeded, or
will exceed, the response capabilities of local, State, and Federal civilian
agencies." '191 Like the language in the proposed House amendment, this
presidential declaration requirement is open-ended and does not particu-
larize, in any detail, the conditions that could give rise to call-up.
The Senate proposal only eliminates the prohibition on disaster call-up
and authorizes federalized military under the rubric of Insurrection Act
procedures. As amended by the Senate proposal, the Insurrection Act au-
thorities may be exercised only when the President determines: "(i) domes-
tic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities
of the State . . . are incapable of maintaining public order; and (ii) such
violence results in a condition described in paragraph (2).
' ' 192
The paragraph 2 condition is one that
187. S. 2766 at § 1042.
188. Id.
189. Letter from Governors Mike Huckabee & Janet Napolitano to Duncan Hunter, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services, and Ike Skelton, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 1, 2006), available at http://www.nga.org.
190. Id.
191. 10 U.S.C. § 12304(c)(3) (2006).
192. S. 2766 at § 1042.
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(A) so hinders the execution of the laws of a State ... and of
the United States within that State ... that any part or class
of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or
protection named in the Constitution and secured by law,
and the constituted authorities of that State ... are unable,
fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or
to give that protection; or (B) opposes or obstructs the exe-
cution of the laws of the United States or impedes the
course of justice under those laws. 9 3
The President would also be obligated to notify Congress "as soon as
practicable after the determination and every 14 days thereafter" while the
authority is being exercised.194 The findings required by the Insurrection
Act are surely more fulsome and require greater care by the federal au-
thorities in specifying the circumstances that justify the federalized military
response. First, "domestic violence" is the triggering event, and then the
federal response may be initiated only if the President finds that state and
local authorities are "incapable" of maintaining order. Second, rather than
a wholesale takeover of disaster response from state and local authorities,
this authorization is directed at dealing with domestic violence only.
One other part of the reform proposal concerns Weapons of Mass De-
struction Civil Support Teams ("WMD-CST"), units of full-time National
Guard personnel authorized by statute to support emergency response in
the same two categories of crisis sanctioned under the existing PRC-po-
tential weapon of mass destruction attacks or threatened or actual terrorist
attacks. 195 When deployed, a WMD-CST would quickly assist civil authori-
ties with situational assessment, advise on response options, and facilitate
additional response equipment and forces.'9 6 Both the House and Senate
Defense Authorization bills expand the use of WMD-CSTs to natural or
manmade disasters that could result in catastrophic loss of life or prop-
erty.1 97 Although such an expansion may test the resources of the limited
number of WMD-CSTs, there is consensus in the two bills on the wisdom
of so expanding the program.
As adjutant generals from the Gulf States noted after Admiral Keat-
ing's proposal for federal leadership, the better reform may be to transform
NORTHCOM into a National Guard command, led by a Guard officer, for
the reasons amplified by Keating's hearing testimony.' 98 In those circum-
stances, when NORTHCOM is needed for civil support-domestic disas-
ters or even a terrorism crisis-the Guard structure may be the preferred
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c) (1998 & Supp. 2006).
196. See STEVE BOWMAN, HOMELAND SECURITY: THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REP. No. RL31615 (2003).
197. H.R. 5122, 109th Cong. § 545 (2006); S. 2766 at § 532.
198. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 11, at 94; FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 223.
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one for NORTHCOM participation.199 So long as command for respond-
ing to a homeland defense (as opposed to homeland security) operation
would remain with active duty military, a dual-hatted NORTHCOM may
be a prudent step toward better integration of federal and state military
resources during domestic crises.
C. Filling in the Blanks in the Plans
The timeliness of the federal military response was affected by more
than federalism, politics, and sub-par leadership. The federal plans them-
selves-the NRP and NRP-CIA-do not clearly state exactly what the mil-
itary should do during a catastrophe or when the military should assume a
lead role when state and local resources are overwhelmed. The NRP pro-
vides for a "proactive national response to a catastrophic incident" in antic-
ipation of an event "that almost immediately exceeds resources normally
available" to state and local authorities.20 0 However, the NRP fails to dis-
tinguish between DOD support to smaller and catastrophic crises. The
document simply states that DOD has significant resources to respond to
an INS, but it says little about what those assets are or how they would be
utilized.20 1 Likewise, the NRP-CIA speaks in generalities and provides few
details about an anticipated federal response when state and local re-
sources are overwhelmed.20 2
At least until the NRP-CIA is updated with a CIS, the plans assume
that overwhelmed state and local incident command authorities will be able
to integrate arriving federal assets into their response during the first forty-
eight to seventy-two hours of the response. Assuming incapacity of state
and local response, the system, thus, sustains delay.203 As the General Ac-
counting Office ("GAO") found in a post-Katrina report, DOD should
promptly develop detailed plans that spell out exactly which capabilities
DOD military assets can and should provide in support of civil authorities
in a range of domestic disasters including reconnaissance, communications,
search and rescue, logistics, and integration of active duty with Guard and
Reserve forces.20 4 GAO also recommended the next logical steps in pro-
viding military coordination during domestic disasters-NGB should work
with the governors and their adjutant generals to list the capabilities
EMAC-deployed Guard units would provide during disasters and which
units would do the jobs.20 5 NGB should then, according to GAO, share
that information with NORTHCOM and other DOD entities with civil sup-
port responsibilities.20 6
199. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 223.
200. NRP-CIA, supra note 2, at 1.
201. GAO REPORT, supra note 87, at 15.
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DOD did not perform especially well during Katrina. Part of the
problem was the delay in the President's declaration of a federal emer-
gency and in Secretary Chertoff's declaration of an INS-both of which
had to trigger the military actions. Beyond the politics or leadership fail-
ures, however, the storm itself slowed the deployments, and, after the
storm struck, military bases, roads, and ports were damaged and further
slowed their progress.
What should be done to avert another Katrina-like response to a natu-
ral disaster? The NRP-CIA contemplates a "proactive" federal response,
which is potentially led by military assets.2 °v However, the crisis decisions
that must be made by civilians (who may be compromised by counter-
vailing pressures in our federal system) weigh against a timely DOD de-
ployment. Moreover, due to DOD's traditional view that disaster relief is a
secondary role, its leadership is more prone to be reactive than proactive.
Instead of requiring affirmative decisions by federal officials or a state gov-
ernor that their assets are "overwhelmed" before requesting DOD assis-
tance, some trusted group of persons outside the immediate crisis could be
given the authority to trigger the proactive response and enhanced military
participation.
In addition, FEMA messed up. Why? Maybe it was a leadership
problem. Perhaps burying FEMA inside DHS has imposed costs on effec-
tiveness that could not be seen until a crisis like Katrina. The NRP and its
procedures and annexes are sound in concept, if not sufficient in detail,
including the components that call for DOD support. FEMA and DOD
have worked together effectively in the past; they should be made to do so
once more.
D. Resources, Regional Mechanisms, and the Private Sector
Although it is commonplace for states and cities to object to federally
imposed responsibilities where insufficient federal resources accompany
the new assignment, in disaster preparedness and response the needs are
great, and, in some places, the outcomes of a next under-prepared disaster
would be simply terrible. Regarding the military role, the most important
federal assets are likely to be specialized heavy equipment, aircraft, and
sophisticated communications and tracking technologies that states simply
cannot afford. Direction of those resources should be subject to the state
adjutant generals and their governors.
In addition, EMAC arrangements that have worked well in general
could be enhanced with further regional mechanisms. The EMAC is trig-
gered only when a governor declares a state of emergency or a disaster, and
EMAC arrangements are directed toward response and recovery-not
207. See generally NRP-CIA, supra note 2.
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preparedness and planning.20 8 Others have proposed a Regional Emer-
gency Management Support System ("REMSS"), a new compact or set of
compacts among self-identified states that would move to a regional model
to plan for disaster response.20 9 . This overlay to the EMAC makes good
sense, and it would do nothing to stand in the way of the work that EMAC
states are providing through their governors.
While attention should be given to sharpening the NRP and NRP-
CIA, those documents and HSPDs insufficiently take into account the im-
portant role that private sector actors can and should play in disaster re-
sponse. From the obvious players-for example, the American Red Cross
or a Wal-Mart distribution center that can deliver medicines in a crisis-
networks of potential responders should be formed that have important
private sector assets well represented. As the response to Katrina re-
vealed, public health and housing were two critical components that could
have been much improved with a greater role for private sector
participants.
VI. CONCLUSION
One common view is that a central impediment to efficient emergency
response in the event of natural disaster is our federal system. There is no
doubt that mayors and governors are foundational players in disaster deci-
sion making-even where local and state resources cannot implement an
effective response. The mechanisms for the President to assert federal con-
trol are spelled out roughly in the Constitution and in some federal statutes
and planning documents. However, those written guides cannot overcome
the inevitable need for coordination and political agreement by leaders
who each have a large stake in the decisions to be made.
The key element in disaster response is not a clear and efficient chain
of command-vertical integration of decision making from top to bottom.
Instead, what is needed is unified command-coordinating decision makers
to be certain they are on the same page. The "who's in charge" question
will always loom in disaster planning and implementation, but fighting over
who makes decisions in a system where autonomy of decision making is
constitutionally preserved helps no one. Unified command requires agree-
ment in advance about who makes which decisions and also requires prac-
tice-exercising the ICS or some variant of it that matches the likely
circumstances for its use. The vertical lines are important for clarifying
roles and responsibilities, but horizontal cooperation and unity will get the
work accomplished during a crisis.
To the extent that military support is required for effective disaster
response, the State-controlled National Guard should be called ahead of
208. See generally Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat.
3877 (1996).
209. Jill D. Rhodes & James Jay Carafano, State and Regional Responses to Disasters: Solving the
72-Hour Problem, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.heritage.org/
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active duty military. The local Guard is necessarily better able to respond
promptly to the call-up from the governor, on the ground, where the crisis
looms. Second, unlike their active duty counterparts, the National Guard
is trained and equipped for disaster response operations. Third, to the ex-
tent that disaster response involves law enforcement-tasks as mundane as
directing traffic and as dramatic as coming to the aid of an officer who is
under attack and outnumbered-posse comitatus restrictions (or even a
perception of such limitations) could inhibit the ability of active duty
troops to perform needed roles. Finally, State Guard units support local
first responders and state and local emergency management teams. Active
duty troops are not trained to work in such configurations and in coopera-
tion with state and local civilians.
One of the downsides of our federal system in a time of crisis is its
quaintness. Our local governments were often constituted to follow geo-
graphic quirks (like rivers or old maps) or to ensure that citizens could
reach the seat of government within a day's ride on horseback. One mod-
ern manifestation of our local tendencies is that first responders in jurisdic-
tions that are literally neighbors may not be able to communicate on their
emergency radios. In Katrina's aftermath, tourists trapped in New Orleans
at the convention center were advised to evacuate the city across a bridge
that led to neighboring Gretna City, where, they were told, buses would be
waiting for them.21 0 When the tourists dragged their luggage to the bridge,
Gretna City police fired warning shots over their heads and warned them
to return to New Orleans.211 When the tourists in the crowd asked what
they were supposed to do, the armed police told them "that was [the tour-
ists'] problem" and that Gretna City "was not going to become New Orle-
ans. '"212 Similar stories of jurisdictional boundaries getting in the way of
disaster response were legion after Katrina.
Too often, respect for traditional lines of government gets in the way
of doing the business of government. Federalism enhances the opportuni-
ties for venerating traditional ways of doing things over getting things
done, but it is not the cause of the poor performance. Bringing the decision
makers to a common understanding about the decisions made and coordi-
nating their actions through unified command will overcome jurisdictional
boundaries.
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